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ABSTRACT 
A pluralistic evaluation of belief plausibility is introduced by extending the notion 
of plausibility index introduced by Rescher. The properties of the extended 
plausibility are analyzed by comparing its properties with those of probability 
theoretic indexing and Rescher's indexing of beliefs. Also it is shown that the new 
indexing method can be effectively utilized in truth maintenance of beliefs in 
complex and dynamically changing situations. First, the reason we focus our 
attention on Rescher's plausibility index of beliefs and the necessity for its extension 
are clarified by referring to the method of knowledge organization and maintenance 
called A TMS (assumption-based truth maintenance system) introduced by De Kleer, 
which is an extension of Doyle's TMS. Second, Rescher's plausibility index is briefly 
reviewed. Third, the index is compared with the probability theoretic index of beliefs 
by referring to a system of logic called preference logic that reflects essential features 
of the indices. The comparison clarifies the monotonic, inflexible nature of 
Rescher's index and the need to extend it in order to cope with the nonmonotonic 
nature of truth maintenance in dynamically changing situations. An extension of 
Rescher's plausibility index is introduced, and its properties are examined. Finally, 
an application of the indexing method to A TMS and to default reasoning is 
presented, showing that the proposed indexing method can be effectively utilized in 
truth maintenance of beliefs in complex and dynamically changing situations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recent researches on artificial intelligence have clarified the importance of 
formulating and implementing onmonotonic reasoning in complex and dynami- 
cally changing situations. 
Doyle [1], McDermott and Doyle [2], Reiter [3], and others have introduced 
several important ideas. Among them, Doyle's TMS (truth maintenance system) 
provides a framework for treating consistency maintenance (or reason mainte- 
nance) of a set of beliefs in dynamically changing situations. Recently, De Kleer 
[4] introduced an extension of TMS called ATMS (assumption-based TMS), in 
which mutually inconsistent aspects of beliefs, i.e., assumptions, are allowed to 
coexist, thus providing a more flexible and efficient method of consistency 
maintenance in more complicated situations. 
While a TMS searches for one reasonable, consistent interpretation of the 
current data, an ATMS searches for every possible interpretation f the data by 
employing a set of assumptions about the data. Each of the (partial) truth 
assignments to the assumptions i  called an environment. These environments 
constitute a lattice called an environment lattice. As the number of assumptions 
becomes larger, a combinatorial explosion of the lattice will occur. Hence, some 
sort of confinement ofthe lattice is inevitable, making necessary an intermediary 
aspect between the two systems, that is, one that would search for one 
reasonable interpretation, such as in the TMS, as well as for every possible 
interpretation, such as in the ATMS. 
If we have a certain method of evaluating the plausibility of the environments, 
the examination of less plausible environments can be delayed or omitted 
altogether. In this paper, we introduce the notion of "subjective" evaluation of 
plausibility by extending the notion of Rescher's plausibility index [5, 6] from a 
"pluralistic" point of view; Rescher's index, being "monistic" and of a 
monotonic, inflexible nature, is not suited for coping with the nonmonotonic 
nature of belief revision in dynamically changing situations. 
In the next section, Rescher's plausibility index is briefly reviewed, and the 
comparison of the index with the probability theoretic index of beliefs, an 
"objective" evaluation of their plausibility, is done by referring to a system of 
logic called preference logic [7, 8] in which essential features of the indices are 
reflected. 
The comparison clarifies the monotonic, inflexible nature of Rescher's index 
and the need for its extension i  order to cope with the nonmonotonic nature of 
truth maintenance in dynamically changing situations. Then an extension of the 
index is introduced, and the properties of the new index are examined by 
comparing them with those of other indices such as probability or Rescher's 
plausibility. 
Finally, a way to incorporate the indexing method into ATMS and default 
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reasoning is proposed, showing that it can be effectively utilized in truth 
maintenance of beliefs. 
RESCHER'S PLAUSIBILITY INDEX AND ITS MONOTONICITY 
Rescher [5, 6] introduced the notion of the plausibility of propositions 
(beliefs) that represent, not the degree to which propositions are likely to be true, 
but the extent o which propositions if accepted as true would be "at home." 
Namely, it represents whether or not what a proposition says accords relatively 
well with our expectations. In other words, it represents he "acceptability" ofa 
proposition, not how probable it is. 
For instance, what Mr. Reagan says will be more plausible than what Mr. 
Gorbachev says for the people in the United States; they consider Reagan's 
views on the situation before those of Gorbachev, no matter how probable the 
latter's may be. 
Plausibility represents a sort of subjective commitment to propositions: A
highly plausible proposition is allocated avery safe and secure place among the 
truths. In other words, a proposition with a higher plausibility index than another 
is granted precedence over the other when we have to make a choice between 
them. 
Rescher's plausibility indexing provides a method of picking the most 
plausible and consistent subset from an inconsistent set of beliefs. Suppose that 
beliefs are represented as propositions. The plausibility index evaluates the 
plausibility of propositions through the notion of modal categories, that is, an 
increasing sequence Mo, Mi . . . . .  Mi . . . . .  Mn of a set of propositions that 
satisfy the following conditions [6]: 
(i) p E Mo iff ~ * p? 
(ii) g i  ~ Mj for j > i. 
(iii) M1: a set of mutually consistent propositions. 
(iv) For any i, if p E Mi and ~- * p -~ q, then q E Mi. 
(v) For any proposition p, there exists i such that p E M~. 
(vi) For any i, if p E Mi and p" E Mi, then p ^ p'  E Mi. 
The propositions in M0 (i.e., tautologies in propositional calculus) have the 
highest plausibility, those in M1 - M0 have the second highest, and so on. 
Rescher's plausibility index I of a proposition p is defined as follows: 
I (p)=i  iff p E Mj-Mi_~ for i  >t 0 
where M_ ~ is set to be ~.  
t- * p represents the proposition p is valid in the propositional c lculus, that is, p is a tautology. 
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Figure 1. Illustration of Rescher's plausibility index in terms of modal categories. 
By regard ing each propos i t ion as a set of  cases 2 in which the proposi t ion 
holds,  the indexing method can be character ized by a sequence o f  sets of  cases 
W °, W l, W 2 . . . . .  W" such that 
w w" 
where W ° is the total set of  cases, W ~ :~ ~,  and W n = ~.  Namely ,  as shown 
in F igure I, 
p E M~ i f f  W(p)  D W i 
where W(p)  represents  the set o f  cases where  propos i t ion p holds,  3 and W" is 
2 Each case corresponds toa state (of the world) and is prescribed by a state description, i.e., the 
truth assignments to the primitive proposition, of which every proposition can be represented asa 
logical combination. For instance, if we have three primitive propositions, p q, and r, we have eight 
cases ranging from p A q A r, p A q ^ -- r to --p A -- q A -- r. 
3 Concerning this way of representing propositions, Yager [10] proposed a formulation of default 
reasoning where a case corresponds toa value of a default variable. 
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given as (cf. Katai and Iwai [9]) 
Wi= ['~ W(p) fo r i=0,  1, . . . ,n  
peMi 
It can be readily seen that 
I (p)=i  iff W(p) D W i and W(p) 7b W i-1 for i >/ 1 
I(p)=O iff W(p)= W°: the total set of cases 
As can be readily seen in Figure 1, this indexing method is quite different 
from that based on probability. One of the essential differences i that while 
mutually inconsistent sets of cases may have equal (i.e., equally probable) index 
values in probability indexing, this is not the case in plausibility indexing; that 
is, i fa  set of cases W(p) has an index i [W'(p) D W i and W(p) 23 Wi-q, 
another set of cases W(p')  should have the least value of index, i.e., n [ W(p')  
23 W n- I] when p '  and p are inconsistent with each other and i < n. 
That is to say, plausibility indexing evaluates the possibility of sets of cases 
(beliefs) from only one aspect of cases, i.e., from a monistic aspect, while 
probability indexing evaluates the possibility from various aspects of cases, i.e., 
from a pluralistic aspect. Thus, in the latter, mutually inconsistent aspects are 
allowed to coexist. 
The following discussion reveals the monotonic and inflexible nature of 
Rescher's plausibility indexing of beliefs. 
We extract the essential feature of the plausibility index by regarding the value 
of index as merely an ordinal number, i.e., we focus our attention on evaluating 
the plausibility of cases in comparative ways such as 
p R q: proposition p is more plausible than proposition q
[case W(p)] [case W(q)] 
that is, 
pRq iff I(p) <, I(q) 
If we replace "more plausible" with "preferable," we arrive at the "logic of 
preference" (also called the logic of choice, preference logic, or prohairetic 
logic), which seeks to systematize the formal rules that govern the conception 
"the situation 'p is true' is preferable to the situation 'q is true'." 
We examine the logical relationships among such statements in order to 
determine whether, for example, it is acceptable to argue that 
p R q or p R r implies p R (q V r)? 
For instance, if "using the bus" is preferable to "taking a taxi" or to "going by 
foot," is it always the case that "using the bus" is preferable to "going by taxi 
or by foot"? 
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We [9] have clarified that these logical relationships based on plausibility 
indexing or probability theoretic indexing can be axiomatized by the following 
systems. 
Axioms of Preference Logic Based on the Plausibility Index 
AXZOM 1 p R q V q R p (connectedness) 
Axiom 2 p R q A q R r ~ p R r (transitivity) 
AmoM 3 (p V q) R p (positive disjunctive monotonicity) 
Axiom 4 p R q -~ (p A r) R (q A r) (conjunctive continuity) 
Axioms of Preference Logic Based on the Probability Index 4 
AXIOM 1 p R q V q R p (connectedness) 
AYaOM 2 p R q A q R r ~ p R r (transitivity) 
Axiom 3 (p V q) R p (positive disjunctive monotonicity) 
AmoM 4' p R q ~ (p A 0 R (q A r) provided that r satisfies ~- * (p A - r) 
=- (q ^ - - r )o r ,  equivalently, 
(p v - r )  R (q v ~r )~(p  A r) R (q A r) 
(partial conjunctive continuity) 
Axiom 5" p R q -" (p V r) R (q V r) provided that r satisfies ~ * - (p A r) 
and ~ * - (q  A r) or equivalently, 
(p A --r) R (q A ~r )~(p  V r) R (q V r) 
(partial disjunctive continuity) 
Rules of Inference (Common to Both Systems) 
RULE 1 (RULE OF SUnSTrrUTION) I f  ~ A,  then we have ~ A ', where A '  is 
obtained f rom A by simultaneously replacing the occurrences o f  a 
propositional variable with a formula (proposition). 
RULE 2 (RULE OF TAtrrOLOOOUS I~Dn:FaXaNCE) I f  ~- *p =-- q, then we have 
~-p R q and ~ q R p. 
The most specific point in plausibility is Axiom 4, conjunctive continuity, which 
is far more restrictive than the corresponding weaker axiom 4 ' ,  partial 
conjunctive continuity, in the latter axiomatic system (based on the probability 
index). 
That is, if we adopt he plausibility theoretic evaluation, we will not be able to 
alter the comparative r lation R between p and q, if once established as p R q or 
4 In probability heoretic indexing, p R q is def'med as Prob(p) t> Prob(q). 
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q R p, no matter how important the new information r is. This is because, from 
the implicational form of Axiom 4, if p is once regarded to be more plausible 
than q, then the combination {p, r} (i.e., p A r) should be regarded to be more 
plausible than the combination { q, r} (i.e., q A r) for an arbitrary proposition r.
The above property is due to the fact that the plausibility index evaluates, as 
mentioned earlier, the plausibility of cases only from one fixed and unalterable 
aspect, i.e,, a monistic aspect, and hence is monotonic in nature, while the 
probability index evaluates plausibility from various aspects, thus allowing 
mutually inconsistent aspects to coexist. 
AN EXTENSION OF PLAUSIBILITY INDEXING AND ITS 
NONMONOTONICITY 
In assumption-based truth maintenance, it is necessary to evaluate the 
plausibility of cases not only from one aspect of cases, i.e., from a monistic 
point of view, hut also from mutually inconsistent aspects, i.e., from a 
pluralistic point of view. For this purpose, we introduce the following system of 
sets of cases: 
{w0;  Wll, w '~, .  . . , w~;  w L ,  w L ,  . . . , w21,m, wL ,  wL ,  
. . . .  w L . . . .  w2 wL ,  ~ • . . . . .  Wk,~ . . . .  ; W~.l ..... 1,, 
• . ,  " . . . ,  J J 
W~, l  ..... 1,2' " " Y~. ,1  ..... l , s ) "  " Wk,u , . . . , r , l '  Yk ,u , . . . , r ,2 '  
• • W j " . . . "  W"  W"  • ' k ,u , . . . , r ,v '  ' k ,u , . . . , r , . . . ,1  ) " " " ' k ,u , . . . , r , . . . ,p}  
where W ° is the total set of cases and the following relation is presumed to hold 
for /  /> 1: 
w!  • n w~[ = o 
i f i l * i [  or i2*i~ or . . .  or ii:#i/ for i=1,  2 . . . . .  n 
and the inclusion relationship among them is set to be as shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 3 illustrates these disjunctive or inclusive relationships. 
Using this system, we evaluate the plausibility of proposition p by index I ' ,  
which is defined by the formula 
I ' (p )= i  iff P E Mi and p ~. M~_~ 
where M- I  = 0 and 
W~-  p E Mj( j  i> 0) iff W(p)  D l.J:,...,sj for some Jl, J2 . . . . .  J/ 
For instance, if W(p)  and W(q) are situated as shown in Figure 4, I ' (p )  and 
I ' (q)  are set to be 2 and 3, respectively, i.e., p can be regarded as more 
plausible than q. Let us call the new index an "extended plausibility index." 
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Figure 2. Inclusion relationship among the sets of cases. 
We will analyze the properties of this new index by checking the validity of 
the theses given by von Wright, Chisholm and Sosa, and others on the relation R 
in their logico-philosophical analysis of preference [Rescher [7], von Wright [8], 
Katai and Iwai [9]), where the relation R by this new index is defined as follows: 
pRq iff I ' (p)  <<. I ' (q) 
The list of theses is shown in Table 1. Table 2 depicts the results together with 
the analyses of probability theoretic and Rescher's plausibility theoretic 
indexing. Axiom 4 (conjunctive continuity), representing the fundamental 
difference between plausibility and probability, does not hold in the case of 
extended plausibility indexing. For instance, in the system of Figure 4, we have, 
as mentioned above, 
p R q [ I ' (p)  = 2, I ' (q )= 31 (1) 
but it is not the case that (p ^ r) R (q ^  r) for the proposition r shown in the 
figure, i.e., we have 
- ( (p  ^ r) R (q ^  r)) [I '(p ^ r)=4,  I ' (q ^ r)=3] (2) 
This is due to the fact that, whereas the comparison of p and q can be done 
within the set W~, the comparison of {p, r} and {q, r} (i.e., p A r and q ^ r) 
takes place within the set W~; the point of view shifts from I4,'~ to W2 I. 
It can be said that extended plausibility evaluates the plausibility of 
propositions from a pluralistic point of view; hence, it is nonmonotonic and 
flexible. 
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Table 1. List of the Theses of Preference Logic 
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1. p R q V q R p (connectedness) 
2. p R q ^ q R r ~ p R q (transitivity) 
3. (p v q) R p (positive disjunctive monotonicity) 
4. p R q ~ (p A r) R (q A r) (conjunctive continuity) 
4 ' .  4 holds provided that I-- * (p A --r) ---- (q A --r) or equivalently 
(p V ~ r) R (q V ~ r) ~ (p A r) R (q A r) (partial conjunctive 
continuity) 
5. p R q --* (p V r) R (q V r) (disjunctive continuity) 
5' .  5 holds provided that I-- * - (19 A r) and r-- * - (q A r) or equivalently 
(p A ~ r) R (q ^ - r )  ~ (p V r) R (q V r) (partial disjunctive 
continuity) 
5 ". 5 holds provided that t-- * r - p or I-- * r m q, and ~- * ~ (p A q) or 
equivalently 
p R (~p A q) --* p R (p V q) and ( -p  A q) R p -~ (p v q) R p 
(partial disjunctive continuity) 
6. p R (p V q) ~ p R ( -p  A q) (right subtractability) 
7. (p V q) R p --* ( -p  A q) R p (left subtractability) 
8. ( -p )  R ( -q )  --* q Rp  (contraposability) 
9. p R q --* (p A r) R (q A r) V (p A -- r) R (q A -- r) (weak conjunctive 
continuity) 
10. q R p V r R p ~ (q V r) R p (left mergeability) 
11. p R q A p R r ~ p R (q V r) (right mergeability) 
12. p R q ~ (p A --q) R ( -p  A q) (continuity on symmetric difference) 
13. (q V r) R p --* q R p V r R p (left separability) 
It also should be noted that theses 4, 9, and 12 in Table 1, partial conjunctive 
continuity, weak disjunctive continuity, and continuity on symmetric difference, 
which are valid in both Rescher's and probability theoretic indexing, are no 
longer valid in extended plausibility indexing. For example, in the system of 
Figure 4, contradicting the ninth thesis, we have 
Table 2. Validity of the Theses 
1 2 3 4 4' 5 5' 5 # 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Probability 0 0 0 x 0 x x x 0 x 0 0 0 x 0 x 
Rescher's 0 0 0 0 0 x x x 0 x x 0 0 x 0 x 
plausibility 
Extended 0 0 0 x x x x x 0 x x x 0 x x x 
plausibility 
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- ( (p  A - - r )  R (q  ^ - r ) )  [ I ' (p  A - - r )=4,  l ' (q  A - - r )=3]  
together with (1) and (2) above. Hence it can be said that here is a high degree of 
flexibility in the proposed indexing method in maintaining various points of 
view, since a current point of view does not necessarily preclude a future point 
of view. 
APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED INDEXING METHOD TO 
ASSUMPTION-BASED TRUTH MAINTENANCE 
De Kleer [4] introduced a system of truth maintenance (consistency 
maintenance ofbeliefs) in which several mutually inconsistent sets of beliefs are 
allowed to coexist, each of which reflects one aspect of interpretation of the 
outside world, i.e., an assumption about the outside world. 
The method of plausibility indexing for the beliefs just introduced provides an 
efficient way of consistency maintenance under sets of assumptions that are 
mutually inconsistent. 
Let the set of propositions (candidates for assumptions) be denoted as P = 
{PI', P2 . . . . .  Pro}" We arrange the order according to their plausibility and 
represent them as 
P= {P l ,  P2 . . . . .  Pi l ;  P i I+ I ,  P i l+2  . . . . .  Pi l+i2;  P i l+ i2+l ,  P i l+i2+2,  
• . . , Pi l+i2+i3; • . . ; P i l+ i2+. . .+ in_ l+ l ,  P i l+ i2+. . .+ in_ l+2 . . . .  , 
P i l+ i2+. . '+ in_ l+ in} .  
Each subset 
131 = {P l ,  P2 . . . . .  P i l}  
/)2 = {P i l+ I ,  P i l+2  . . . . .  P i l+ i  2} 
~:~n = {P i l  +i2+ ,.. +in_ 1+I,  Pi l  + i2+. . .+in_  l + 2 . . . . .  P i l  +i2+.. .  +in_l  + in} 
of P consists of beliefs with the same value of (extended) plausibility index, 
where Pt represents the set of most plausible beliefs and Pn the set of least 
plausible beliefs. 
For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that each/gj ( j  = 1, 2 . . . . .  n) 
consists of mutually inconsistent beliefs, i.e., p i  I +. . .  +/./-_ 1 + 1, Pi l  +""  + ij_ 1 + 2, • • 
• , andpil +... +~_ 1 +q are mutually inconsistent with each other. The general case 
can be treated in a similar manner by dividing the set P; ( j  = 1, 2 . . . . .  n) into 
mutually inconsistent subsets. 
These propositions in P are organized by the following method, yielding 
systematized sets of cases { WJI,;2,...,;j}, each of which represents a set of 
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assumptions. The plausibil ity of  an arbitrarily g iven bel ief  under these sets of 
assumptions can be evaluated according to the plausibility-indexing method 
introduced above. We will make a system of subsets {PJJld2,.-,Jj } (J = 1, 2, . . 
., n) of P as shown in Figure 5. 
If an inconsistent set of propositions appears, then the set is removed from the 
system. The set of cases J W)l,j2,...,jy is given as 
J 
Wjl,j2 ..,dj= { w; each Pit, PYl+J2 . . . . .  
and PJl+J2÷ "-" +Jj is true in case w} 
It can be readily seen that the system { J W)t,j2,...,jj } can provide a plausibility- 
indexing framework. The index can also be written as 
p E Mj iff PJJl,J2,"',yj t--* p for some Jl, J2 . . . . .  Jj 
where ~- * means that p can be derived logically from the assumption set 
p J . .  
Jl,~2,...,Jj- 
In order to implement a flexible ATMS that can cope with dynamically 
changing situations, the system of assumptions introduced above must be able to 
adapt to an arbitrarily and newly introduced assumption• Suppose that an 
assumption, say p, with plausibility index j is introduced. The sets with a lower 
plausibility index (hence high plausibility) than j should not be affected by the 
introduction of p, for they have priority over p. Hence, the revision of the 
system starts at the sets of assumptions whose index value equals j. That is, 
• j l  
P~Jld2,...,Jj iS altered to Pfil,J2,...,Jj, where 
p J:'. 
Jl,J2,...,Jj 
I p~ . . 
~--  Jijl,J2,...,jj t3 {p} if (COND1) and (COND2) hold (3) 
i .  PJI,YZ,...,Jy if either (COND1) or (COND2) does not hold (4) 
where J (COND1): PJ[,Jz,...,Jj is consistent with p 
J V-* 5 (COND2): P Jl,J2,...,Jj P 
(COND2) represents the condition that p is not redundant, o /~Jld2,...,Jj" 
Formula (3) means that i fp  is consistent and not redundant to PJJl,J2,...,Jj, then it 
is supplementary to P~J,J2,...,Jy" 
These alterations also affect he sets with indices greater thanj (the sets of less 
plausible assumptions than p), " k k, i .e . ,  P l,k2,...,k  (k  > j ) i s  a l te red  to  ID l,k2,...,k  as  
follows: 
j ' _ 
If Pkk l,k 2 . . . . .  kk D PJI.J2,...,Jj such that PJI,J2,...,Jj E (~J 
D k P D k 
then  "- kl,k2,...,kk -~" J- kl,k2,...,kk (5 )  
5 b- * represents that p cannot be derived logically from the assumption set P~h.J2..., Jj"
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If v kk,. 2, D ,jj such that e then 
pk , --k k I-" * (6) kl,k2,...,kk -~- l"kl,k2, ..,,k  when Pkl,k2,...,kk p 
pk, pk k 
kl,k2,...,kk -~" kl,k2,...,kk U { p } when Pkl,k2,...,kk is consistent withp 
k 
and Pk l  ,k2,.. ,kk tg" * p (7) 
k 
Pkl,k2,...,kk lS deleted from the system 
k 
when Pkl,k2,...,kk is inconsistent with p (8) 
where 
J 6'J+ = {PJl,J2,...Jj" which satisfies (COND1) and (COND2)} 
(P J- = {PJm,J2,...,Jj: which does not satisfy either (COND1) or (COND2)} 
Statement (5) means that any superset of an unaltered set remains unaltered; (6) 
means that the sets that are supersets of an altered set to which p is redundant 
remain unaltered; (7) means that the sets that are supersets of an altered set with 
which p is neither inconsistent nor redundant are supplemented with p; (8) 
means that the sets that are supersets of an altered set with which p is 
inconsistent are deleted from the system. 
The corresponding system of sets of cases are revised as illustrated in the 
following. 
Suppose that a new assumption is introduced to the system shown in Figure 3, 
resulting in the corresponding set of cases hown in Figure 6. Let us assume that 
its plausibility index is 2. The sets of cases with plausibility index 1 necessarily 
remain unaltered, but among the sets of cases with plausibility index 2, only the 
set W~., is altered and confined to a more restricted set of cases (indicated by a 
broken line), while those sets with plausibility indices greater than 2 (encircled 
by a dotted line) are consequently deleted from the system. All other sets are 
unaltered. 
These alterations are quite systematic and can be efficiently carried out. 
Also, the indexing method can be applied to the control and maintenance of
inference processes that include default rules of inference. For instance, if we 
have the following one fact and two default rules of inference (Etherington and 
Reiter [111), the method can be applied as shown here: 
"Molluscs are normally shell-bearers." 
(FACT1) (Vx)(Ce(x)--*Mo(x)) 
Ce(x) A M-  Sb(x) 
(RULED (vx) 
-Sb(x) 
Mo(x) A M Sb(x) 
(RULE2) (vx) 
Sb(x) 
"Cephalopods must be molluscs 
but normally are not shell-bearers." 
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where M represents a (modal) operator indicating that "it is possible (or 
consistent with the given data) to assume [a certain proposition]." 
Suppose that we attach plausibility index values I, 2, and 3 to (FACTI), 
(RULE1), and (RULE2), respectively. That is, (FACT1) has precedence over 
(RULE1), which in turn has precedence over (RULE2). Then the set P of 
propositions can be written as follows: 
P= {Ce(x)-+Mo(x); Ce(x) ^  M-Sb(x)  ^ -Sb(x) ,  Ce(x) ^  -M-Sb(x) ,  
-Ce(x); Me(x) A M Sb(x) A Sb(x), Me(x) A -M Sb(x), -Me(x)} 
In this case the above-mentioned system of sets of propositions can be written 
as shown in Figure 7, where the inconsistency of P].2,v for example, is due to 
the property of M, i.e., - M - Sb(x) entails M Sb(x). 
Suppose that the following new fact is introduced: 
"A nautilus n is a cephalopod and also a shell-bearer." 
i.e., 
(FACT2) Na(n) A Ce(n) ^  Sb(n) 
Then, if we assume that this fact is highly plausible and is given the plausibility 
index 1, then only the sets Pl, P2,2, and psl,2,1 need to be altered as follows: 
P i '  =P~ O {Ce(n)--*Mo(n), Ce(n), Mo(n), Na(n), Sb(n)} 
u p- 
2 P~1.2=PI,2 O {Ce(n)~Moin), Ce(n), Me(n), Nain), 
~ m - Sb(n), Sb(n)} 
_p2 O P" 
- -  1 ,2  
t ~ 3 
J~l,2,1-PI,2,1 LJ {Ce(n)--*Mo(n), Ce(n) ,  Me(n) ,  
-M-Sb(n) ,  Sb(n), M Sb(n)} 6 
=P~,2,t O P~ 
where/~n is {Ce(n), Me(n), Na(n), Sb(n)}. 
The other sets (general assumptions) are not altered, that is, the instantiation 
of the general assumptions cannot be carried out consistently for individual n 
(since it contradicts the general assumptions). In this case we can say that a 
nautilus n is a moUusc with plausibility index 1 [I' (Me(n)) = 1 because of PI]. 
As shown above, the system can alter its assumption sets and beliefs to 
s ht these ~ o n s ,  several redundant propositions arc included: for example, "Ce(n) 
Me(n)" is redundant if "Me(n)" is already included in the set, and "M Sb(n)," and 
"~ M - Sb(n)" are redundant, from the definition of M, if "Sb (n)" is already included in the set. 
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incorporate new information quite efficiently, since the alterations (done by set 
operations) are localized ue to the treelike structure shown in Figures 5 and 7. 
CONCLUSION 
We have proposed a method of organizing and maintaining the current set of 
beliefs concerning a problem in a dynamically changing situation by extending 
the notion of plausibility introduced by Reseher. The main thrust of the 
extension is to evaluate the subjective plausibility of beliefs from a pluralistic 
point of view, which results in a quite flexible method of evaluation. It is shown 
in the application section that this method of evaluation can be utilized to control 
the order of inference and to organize beliefs or assumptions in a treelike 
system, as illustrated in Figures 2, 3, 5, and 7, by which the revision of beliefs, 
regarded as quite important in implementing nonmonotonic reasoning systems, 
can be carried out quite flexibly and efficiently. Its high flexibility is due to the 
nonmonotonicity of the index, and the high efficiency is mainly due to the 
structure of belief organization, the treelike system, wherein consistent beliefs of 
the same plausibility are chunked together and their revision is quite localized 
compared with the case of the unchunked, latticelike structures uch as the 
environment lattice in De Kleer's ATMS. 
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